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When Should a Habeas Claim
Be Dismissed as Being a
"Second or Successive" Application?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 25-29. © 1999 American Bar Association.
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ISSUE
If a person's petition for habeas cor-
pus is dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies and the per-
son later exhausts his state reme-
dies and refiles the petition, are the
claims within that petition that
were not included in the initial fil-
ing "second or successive" habeas
applications?
FACTS
In 1989, 19-year-old Antonio T.
Slack was charged with first-degree
murder of 12-year-old Alanna
Holmes, who had died from a single,
close-range shot in the neck. Slack
turned himself in to police soon
after the shooting because he was
"having nightmares about seeing her
when we was playing with the gun
and she died." At the trial, Slack
admitted that he had shot Holmes
but claimed that the killing was
accidental. The jury convicted Slack
of second-degree murder. The court
sentenced him to life imprisonment
in the Nevada State Prison and
imposed a consecutive life sentence
because he had used a deadly
weapon in connection with the
killing.
Slack appealed his conviction to the
Nevada Supreme Court, claiming
that there was insufficient evidence
adduced at his trial to convict him,
that state law improperly allowed
evidence of Slack's sexual relation-
ship with the victim, that the jury
instruction regarding reasonable
doubt was improper, and that the
trial court erred by not adequately
defining premeditation in the jury
instruction.
After his appeal was dismissed by
the Nevada Supreme Court in 1991,
Slack, representing himself, filed a
petition for a Section 2254 writ of
habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada.
Slack contended that insufficient
evidence was adduced at trial to
convict him of second-degree
(Continued on Page 26)
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law,
Marquette University Law School,
Milwaukee, Wis.; jgrenig@earth-
link.net or (414) 288-5377. Prof.
Grenig is the co-author of West's
Handbook of Federal Civil
Discovery and Disclosure.
SLACK V MCDANIEL, WARDEN
DOCKET No. 98-6322
ARGUMENT DATE:
OCTOBER 4, 1999
FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
, ., "3;. 
,  
' "
, \%11 -H A B E A S
murder, that the trial court improp-
erly allowed prejudicial evidence of
a sexual relationship between Slack
and the 12-year-old victim, that the
"reasonable doubt" instruction vio-
lated the due process clause of the
Constitution, and that the trial
court had erred in not adequately
defining premeditation in the jury
instructions regarding murder.
Slack later moved to stay the pro-
ceedings on his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus so that he could pur-
sue postconviction relief proceed-
ings in the Nevada state courts.
Included in the motion was a list of
unexhausted issues, not contained
in his initial filing, that Slack pro-
posed to exhaust during the state
court habeas corpus proceedings.
The district court dismissed this
petition without prejudice so
that Slack could exhaust his state
remedies.
In July 1992, Slack, again represent-
ing himself, filed a petition for post-
conviction relief in a Nevada state
court. In his petition, Slack alleged
he had been denied his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to
the effective assistance of trial coun-
sel in that his counsel (1) failed to
find out what kind of deal was made
with co-defendant Kamal Bey; (2)
failed to file a pretrial motion in
limine to stop the introduction of
prior evidence regarding Slack's sex-
ual relationship with the victim; (3)
failed to file a pretrial motion in
limine to stop the testimony of Bey,
as Bey's plea bargain with the prose-
cution was contingent on his trial
testimony; (4) failed to interview
Slack's brother to refute the testi-
mony of Bey; (5) failed to ask Bey
what deals he had made with the
state for his testimony; (6) failed to
request an accomplice instruction;
(7) failed to have evidence present-
ed to the jury that the only finger-
prints found on the murder weapon
were those of Bey; and (8) that
these alleged errors prejudiced him.
Slack also claimed that he had been
denied effective appellate counsel in
that counsel on appeal to the
Nevada Supreme Court (1) failed to
raise a violation of state law relating
to testimony by a co-defendant; (2)
failed to raise the issue that counsel
failed to request an accomplice
instruction; (3) failed to raise the
issue that Bey was a co-defendant
and his testimony was questionable;
(4) failed to raise an issue of prose-
cutorial misconduct when the pros-
ecutor failed to inform the jury that
Bey was a co-defendant as well as of
the fact that Bey's fingerprints were
the only fingerprints found on the
murder weapon. The Nevada trial
court denied the petition and the
Nevada Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal in December 1993.
In 1995, Slack filed a Section 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court, containing the
claims Slack had presented in the
Nevada courts as well as the issues
raised in the 1991 filing. After coun-
sel was appointed to represent
Slack, an amended petition was filed
on Dec. 24, 1997. This amended
petition alleged (1) there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the con-
viction; (2) there was insufficient
notice provided by the charging
documents; (3) there was improper
introduction of Slack's sexual rela-
tionship with the victim; (4) the
court failed to instruct the jury
properly on (a) reasonable doubt,
(b) premeditation and deliberation,
and (c) malice aforethought; (5)
there was ineffective assistance of
trial; (6) there was ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel; and (7)
there was cumulative error.
The state of Nevada moved to dis-
miss grounds two, three, four(c),
five, six, and seven, alleging that
Slack had failed completely to
exhaust his state remedies. The
state also argued that grounds two,
four(c), five, six, and seven were not
raised in Slack's first federal petition
and constituted an abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus.
On March 13, 1998, the district
court entered an order dismissing
grounds two, four(c), five, six, and
seven as abusive under Farmer v.
McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1188
(1997), since they had not been
raised in Slack's first federal peti-
tion. The court also found that
ground three of Slack's petition was
unexhausted and therefore dis-
missed his petition.
The district court gave Slack the
option of reopening the proceeding
and abandoning his claim on ground
three if he wished to continue in
federal court with the remaining
exhausted claims. Rather than pro-
ceeding with the remaining exhaust-
ed claims, Slack filed a notice of
appeal. In May 1998, the district
court denied Slack's application for
a certificate of probable cause to
appeal. On July 7, 1998, a two-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit summarily
denied Slack's request for a certifi-
cate of probable cause. On Feb. 22,
1999, the Supreme Court granted
Slack's petition for a writ of
certiorari.
CASE ANALYSIS
The writ of habeas corpus provides
a means by which the legal authori-
ty under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to re-examine
federal constitutional issues even
after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
Issue No. 1
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
A state prisoner is ordinarily not
able to obtain a writ of habeas cor-
pus from a federal court unless the
prisoner has "exhausted" the reme-
dies available in state court. Ex
parte RoyalU, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
The exhaustion requirement gives
the state an initial opportunity to
pass upon and correct alleged viola-
tions of its prisoners' federal rights.
See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 257 (1986). This requirement
was put in statutory form in 1948 in
28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("An application
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears ...
the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of
the State. ...")
In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(1982), the Supreme Court adopted
a "total exhaustion" rule requiring a
district court to dismiss petitions
containing grounds on which the
petitioner has exhausted state reme-
dies and other grounds on which
the state remedies are not exhaust-
ed. However, the Court stated that
prisoners who submit such "mixed
petitions" nevertheless are entitled
to resubmit a petition with only
exhausted claims or to exhaust the
remainder of their claims. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion
warned, however, that a prisoner
who decides to proceed only with
his exhausted claims and deliberate-
ly sets aside his unexhausted claims
risks dismissal of any later petitions.
The state of Nevada argues that
there is nothing in Rose supporting
the proposition that a state prisoner
is entitled to multiple dismissals
without prejudice when the prisoner
returns to federal court with new
unexhausted claims despite a previ-
ous dismissal without prejudice that
was granted for the purpose of
allowing the petitioner to fully
exhaust state court remedies. The
state explains that the application of
the abuse of the writ doctrine to
new claims, regardless of whether a
prior petition was adjudicated on
the merits, is consistent with the
principle that a habeas petitioner
may not engage in piecemeal litiga-
tion. According to the state of
Nevada, state respondents should
not be required to appear in federal
court time and again only to have
serial federal petitions dismissed
for failure to exhaust state court
remedies.
Slack recognizes that, under Rose, a
federal habeas petitioner is pre-
sumptively entitled to only a single
adjudication of his claims by the
federal courts and that adjudication
can occur only after the petitioner
has fully exhausted any available
state remedies for all the constitu-
tional claims on which he or she
wants to proceed. Slack asserts that
the requirement that a petitioner
exhaust state remedies contem-
plates that a federal court's dis-
missal "without prejudice" in order
to permit proceedings in state
courts does not have a preclusive
effect on any later federal habeas
proceedings.
Congress made a number of impor-
tant changes to the habeas corpus
statutes in 1996 as part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA). Although the
requirement of exhaustion of state
remedies was preserved, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b) was amended to provide a
limit on second or successive appli-
cations by prisoners in state cus-
tody. Under this provision, a claim
presented in a second or successive
application that was presented in an
earlier application will be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
If the claim in a second or succes-
sive application was not presented
in a previous application, it will be
dismissed unless the applicant
shows that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.
Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts
provides: "A second or successive
petition may be dismissed if the
judge finds that it fails to allege new
or different grounds for relief and
the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different
grounds are alleged, the judge finds
that the failure to assert those
grounds in a prior petition consti-
tuted an abuse of the writ."
Once a federal adjudication occurs,
the litigation is presumptively over
and the federal adjudication creates
the potential that later proceedings
will constitute an "abuse of the
writ" under Rule 9(b).
Slack's petitions were filed before
the enactment of the AEDPA, but
he asserts that the definition of a
"second or successive" habeas cor-
pus application is the same under
both AEDPA and pre-AEDPA law.
According to Slack, the Supreme
Court's precedents on exhaustion
and abuse of the writ of habeas
corpus have rested on the premise
that a second or successive habeas
corpus application is one filed after
a previous federal application has
been adjudicated on the merits.
According to Slack, the Ninth
Circuit's ruling improperly give
preclusive effect to any claim not in
the prematurely filed petition that
was dismissed "without prejudice."
Slack claims that the Ninth Circuit
has substantially deprived prisoners
of any opportunity to be heard in
(Continued on Page 28)
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federal habeas corpus proceedings
by adopting an ad hoe definition of
the term "second or successive"
that attaches preclusive, or "res
judicata," effect to a prior "without
prejudice" dismissal for lack for
complete exhaustion.
Slack argues that the unfairness
inherent in such a rule is demon-
strated by this case, in which the
district court applied the Ninth
Circuit's punitive rule to bar Slack
from pursuing his claims simply for
trying to do what the Supreme
Court has contemplated under the
complete exhaustion rule of Rose v.
Lundy. Slack contends that the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of a post-
exhaustion petition as a second or
successive habeas corpus petition
will introduce substantial uncertain-
ty and unfairness into habeas cor-
pus litigation.
The state of Nevada contends that
Slack's argument ignores the fact
that this case does not deal with the
preclusion of properly exhausted
claims. After one dismissal without
prejudice designed to allow Slack to
exhaust his state court remedies,
the state says that Slack returned to
federal court and improperly raised
five unexhausted claims that had
never appeared in any of his prior
federal or state challenges to his
conviction.
The state stresses that application
of the abuse of the writ doctrine
does not require a prior adjudica-
tion on the merits. Relying on
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1 (1963), the state argues that the
Supreme Court has made a clear
distinction between, on the one
hand, successive petitions that fol-
low a petition that was determined
on the merits, and on the other
hand, successive petitions that fol-
low a petition that was not deter-
mined on the merits. It contends
that the Court's opinion in Sanders
and Rule 9(b) make it clear that a
prior adjudication on the merits is
not necessary for a finding that new
claims raised in a successive peti-
tion constitute an abuse of the writ.
SIGNIFICANCE
In 1998, the Supreme Court held
that a habeas corpus claim that the
defendant was incompetent to be
executed, raised for a second time
after the defendant's first claim was
dismissed without prejudice by the
district court as premature, was not
a "second or successive" applica-
tion. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998). The Court
stated that the defendant was enti-
tled to an adjudication of all the
claims presented in his earlier appli-
cation for habeas corpus. The Court
explained that it has never suggest-
ed that a prisoner whose habeas
petition was dismissed for failing to
exhaust state remedies, and who
then exhausted those remedies and
returned to federal court, should be
considered to have filed a succes-
sive petition.
Noting that the first petition had
been dismissed without prejudice
for failure to exhaust state remedies,
the Court declared that the defen-
dant had not received an adjudica-
tion of his claim. To hold otherwise,
the Court said, would mean that a
dismissal of a first habeas petition
for technical procedural reasons
having nothing to do with the
claims' merits, would bar the pris-
oner from ever obtaining federal
habeas review.
A number of courts of appeals have
also held that, where a first petition
is dismissed on exhaustion grounds,
the filing of a later petition is not a
second or successive petition. In
Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44 (2d
Cir. 1996), the government argued
that a habeas petitioner was limited
to those claims contained in the ini-
tial habeas corpus filing, which had
previously been dismissed without
prejudice. The Second Circuit
rejected this argument, reasoning
that, "because application of the
gatekeeping provisions to deny a
resubmitted petition in cases such
as this would effectively preclude
any habeas review, such a holding
would conflict with the doctrine of
writ abuse." See also Dickinson v.
Maine, 101 F.3d 791 (1st Cir. 1996);
Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208
(3d Cir. 1997); In re Gasery, 116
F.3d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997);
Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 322
n.1 (5th Cir. 1991); Carlson v.
Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.
1998); Benton v. Washington, 106
F.3d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1996);
Dellenbach v. Hanks, 75 F.3d 820,
822 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v.
Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th
Cir. 1990); McWilliams v. State of
Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th
Cir. 1997).
In Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d
1548 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1188 (1997), the Ninth
Circuit, relying on Rule 9(b), held
that a prior adjudication on the
merits was not a prerequisite to the
application of the doctrine of abuse
of the writ. It pointed out that Rule
9(b) appears to contemplate two
possibilities for dismissal of a sec-
ond or successive petition. The first
occurs when a judge finds that the
petition does not allege new or dif-
ferent grounds and that the prior
determination was on the merits.
The second arises when new and
different grounds are alleged and
the judge finds that the petitioner's
failure to assert them in a prior peti-
tion was an abuse of the writ. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Rule
9(b) distinguishes between "same
ground" and "new and different
ground" petitions and that a court
may dismiss a "new and different
Issue No. 1
ground" petition if the government
shows there has been an abuse of
the writ.
The use of federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners has long been a con-
troversial subject even though pris-
oners are successful in no more
than 4 percent of the cases. More
than one hundred years ago there
were protests against "the prostitu-
tion of the writ of habeas corpus
under which the decisions of the
state courts are subjected to the
superintendency of the Federal
judges...." Note, Federal Abuses of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 25
Am.L.Rev. 149, 153 (1898). In
1954, the attorneys general of 41
states attempted to have the habeas
corpus statute, insofar as it applies
to state prisoners, declared uncon-
stitutional. United States ex rel.
Elliot v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851
(1954). In 1954, the Judicial
Conference of the United States also
unsuccessfully proposed an amend-
ment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that would
have virtually ended federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners.
If the Supreme Court upholds the
Ninth Circuit's decision in this case,
it will be more difficult for state
prisoners to challenge their convic-
tions in federal court. In particular,
such a decision would greatly
restrict the ability of state prisoners
to bring successive petitions for
habeas corpus alleging new grounds
even if their earlier petitions had
not been decided on the merits. On
the other hand, a reversal of the
Ninth Circuit will make it easier for
state prisoners to have a federal
court decide whether their federal
constitutional rights had been
violated.
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